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TEACHING POLITICAL ECONOMY: ON THE ECONOMICS 
SIGNIFICAMCE OF THE PUBLIC’S JOB APPROVAL RATING 
OF THE PRESIDENT 
 
RICHARD J. CEBULA and HEATHER SMITH 
   
 
This study empirically investigates the hypothesis that the lower the public’s job approval 
rating of the U.S. President, the higher the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax 
evasion in the U.S. Using annual data on aggregate federal personal income tax evasion for the 
period 1960-2001 compiled by Feige, with 2001 being the most recent year for which these data 
are currently available, and allowing for such factors as federal income tax rates, IRS tax return 
audit rates, the tax-free municipal bond yield, the interest rate penalty on detected unreported 
income, public dissatisfaction with government officials (other than the U.S. President), and the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, this study finds consistent empirical support for the hypothesis that income 
tax evasion is a decreasing function of the Presidential approval rating, i.e., that the lower (higher) 
the President’s approval rating, the greater (lower) the degree of aggregate federal personal 
income tax evasion. Finally, use of two well-known alternative estimates of the aggregate degree of 
federal personal income tax evasion yields results generally consistent with these conclusions.   
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
In the U.S., income tax evasion is usually defined as to consist of taxable income that is 
either unreported or underreported to the IRS. Studies of income tax evasion behavior essentially 
fall into three categories. First, there are the principally theoretical models of tax evasion behavior, 
such as Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Falkinger (1988), Klepper, Nagin, and Spurr (1991), Das-
Gupta (1994), Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky (1994), and Caballe and Panades (1997). Second, there 
are a number of studies that either (a) use questionnaires or (b) undertake experiments, such as 
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), Friedland (1982), Spicer and Thomas (1982), Baldry (1987), De Juan 
(1989), Thurman (1991), and Alm, Jackson, and McGee (1992). Third are those studies that use 
what is referred to as "official data," such as Tanzi (1982; 1983), Bawley (1982), Clotfelter (1983), 
Carson (1984), Erard and Feinstein (1994), Feige (1994), Cebula (2001; 2004), and Ali, Cecil, and 
Knoblett (2001).  
In this literature, it is widely believed that the "degree of federal personal income tax 
evasion in the economy as a whole" (hereafter, "DTE") is positively affected by income tax rates  
(Tanzi (1982); Clotfelter (1983); Feige (1994)). Interestingly, Yaniv (1994) qualifies Clotfelter 
(1983) as “the most relevant study” with respect to the impact of income tax rates on tax evasion, 
whereas Cox (1984) and Slemrod (1985) question his findings. In any event, this perspective is 
simple: the higher the income tax rate, the greater the benefit (in terms of a reduced tax liability) 
from not reporting taxable income, ceteris paribus. It is also widely accepted that the greater the 
risk associated with underreporting or not reporting taxable income, the less the degree to which 
economic agents will choose either to not report or to underreport their taxable income (Friedland 
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(1982); Spicer and Thomas (1985); De Juan (1989); Errard and Feinstein (1994)). 
 
From a different perspective, there exists a rich literature that explores a wide variety of 
issues that involve the U.S. Presidential approval rating, including Monroe (1984), Edwards (1991; 
1998), Clarke and Stewart (1994), King (1999), Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2000), Cohen 
(2003), Fox and Phillips (2003), and Canes-Wrone (2004). Interestingly, many of these studies find 
a link between Presidential approval on the one hand and economic performance or lack thereof on 
the other hand. 
This study seeks to add to both the rich literature on income tax evasion and the rich 
literature on U.S. Presidential approval by investigating whether the degree of aggregate federal 
personal income tax evasion is influenced by the public’s job approval rating of the U.S. President. 
In particular, this study attempts to provide insight as to whether the degree of personal income tax 
evasion rises (falls) when the public’s approval rating of the President declines (rises). This 
hypothesis is predicated on the idea that the lower the approval rating, the greater the degree to 
which the public experiences a “secondary benefit/gain” from income tax evasion. The data 
reflecting the public’s job approval rating of the President are obtained from surveys that ask the 
question “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the President’s name] is handling his job as 
President?”  
In an effort to distinguish on the one hand between the public’s job approval rating of the 
U.S. President per se and the public’s dissatisfaction on the other hand with government officials 
other than the President, two of the estimates provided in this study include an alternative variable, 
one that consists of survey data reflecting the latter sentiments, i.e., the public’s dissatisfaction with 
government officials (other than the President). The model is presented in Section II. Naturally, a 
variety of potential income-tax-evasion influencing factors are included in the model. Section III 
provides the formal empirical analysis, whereas Section IV provides concluding observations.   
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
In this study, the relative probability that the representative economic agent will not report 
his/her taxable income to the IRS is treated as an increasing function of the expected gross benefits 
to the agent of not reporting income, eb, and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs to the 
agent of not reporting income, ec. Thus, the ratio of the probability of not reporting income to the 
IRS, pnr, to the probability of reporting income to the IRS, (1-pnr), is described for the 
representative economic agent by: 
 
(1) pnr/(1-pnr) = f(eb, ec), feb > 0, fec < 0        
 
Expressing probabilities in relative terms such as shown in equation (1) possesses the virtue that it 
thereby reflects the form of the tax evasion data, i.e., data where (as described below in Section III) 
the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion (DTE) is expressed in such relative 
terms.  
As already observed, the gross expected benefits from not reporting income to the IRS are 
hypothesized to be an increasing function of the federal personal income tax rate (Cagan (1958); 
Bawley (1982); Tanzi (1982); Clotfelter (1983); Feige (1994)). To reflect the federal personal 
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income tax rate, most previous studies using official data for the U.S. have adopted either of two 
alternative measures: an average effective federal personal income tax rate (AEPT) or the maximum 
marginal federal personal income tax rate (MAXT). In this study, the AEPT measure of the income 
tax rate is adopted because, as argued in Feige (1994), this tax rate is likely to be a more 
representative measure of the personal income tax rate for a larger portion of the taxpaying public 
than MAXT would be. Accordingly, it is hypothesized, ceteris paribus, that: 
 
(2) eb = g(AEPT), gAEPT > 0         
 
Next, this study endeavors to allow for the potential impact of legal tax avoidance on illegal 
tax evasion. To do this, we test the hypothesis by Cebula (2004, p. 419) that “…the higher the tax-
free interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds (TF) relative to the taxable interest rate yield 
on…high quality bonds or notes such as ten year U.S. Treasury notes (TEN), the greater the 
incentive to engage in legal tax avoidance and the lower the incentive to engage in tax evasion.” 
Thus, it is expected that the greater the TF/TEN ratio, the lower the eb, ceteris paribus. Hence, (2) 
is now rewritten as: 
 
(3)  eb= h(AEPT, TF/TEN), hAEPT > 0, hTF/TEN < 0  
      
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) may have been perceived by at least some portion of 
the general public as an honest, good faith effort to reform, i.e., to simplify and increase the equity 
of the Internal Revenue Code. As Musgrave observed (1987, p. 59), “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
is the most sweeping reform since the early 1940s…” Indeed, the TRA did introduce a number of 
reforms, many of which are outlined in broad terms in Barth (1991), Barth and Brumbaugh (1992), 
Ott and Vegari (2003), and Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990). For example, as observed in Ott 
and Vegari (2003, p. 279), “The Act introduced major cuts in the personal tax rate. When fully 
effective (1988) only two tax brackets set at 15 and 28 percent were to replace the 14 bracket tax 
schedule with rates in the range of 11 to 50 percent...[while it] broadened the tax base by reducing 
the itemized deduction.” Musgrave (1987, p. 59) further observes that prior to the TRA, a slow 
erosion of the income tax base had been occurring. Musgrave (1987, p. 57) was particularly 
dismayed by the widening of tax loopholes and the emergence of high income tax shelters that had 
“…gained momentum in recent years and undermined the public’s faith in the income tax. “ In this 
vein, Barth (1991), Barth and Brumbaugh (1992), and Sanger, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1990) 
describe how the TRA decreased depreciation benefits from financial investments in residential as 
well as commercial real estate, established limitations on the tax deductibility of losses from 
“passive” investments that affected limited partnership syndications (including those involving real 
estate ventures), and terminated favorable capital gains treatment of real estate. Musgrave (1987, p. 
59) also expressed concern that the “…compounding of the investment tax credit and accelerated 
depreciation diluted and distorted the base of the corporate income tax.” Musgrave (1987, p. 59) 
asserted that the TRA “…reversed these trends, a major accomplishment that all reformers will 
welcome.” As Barth (1991, pp. 45, 124) observes, among other things, under the TRA the 10 
percent investment tax credit for the purchase of equipment was repealed, and the life of the 
investment was increased for depreciation purposes. Based on Musgrave’s (1987) arguments, then, 
it is expected in the present study that taxpayers might well have favorably regarded the TRA and 
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been less resentful of the Internal Revenue Code than before, at least initially. Thus, it is 
hypothesized here that at the time the TRA was being enacted and becoming fully effective (1986-
1988) and also received the greatest publicity, reduced taxpayer resentment of the federal income 
tax system/Internal Revenue Code would/could, at least temporarily, have resulted in a reduced 
degree of aggregate personal income tax evasion, ceteris paribus. The reason this reaction to the 
TRA might be only temporary is revealed in the words of Slemrod (1992, p. 45), who argues that it 
would take at least some time for taxpayers “…to learn about and adjust to the new law [the TRA].” 
Consequently, it is hypothesized here that, for the period when the TRA was first implemented, 
1986, through the year the TRA became “fully effective,” 1988 (Barth (1991); Barth and 
Brumbaugh (1992)), the eb was reduced. Accordingly, (3) above is replaced by (4): 
 
(4) eb= j(AEPT, TF/TEN, TRA), jAEPT > 0, jTF/TEN <0,  jTRA <0     
 
As will be shown in column (a) of Table 2 of this study, although this variable of and in itself 
generates a negative and statistically significant coefficient, exclusion of this binary variable from 
the estimations does not significantly alter the conclusions of this study. Furthermore, estimating 
with the TRA dummy variable so specified as to include years after 1988 renders this variable 
statistically insignificant, a finding consistent with arguments in Slemrod (1992,  p. 45), although 
the other findings in the model are not seriously affected by so specifying TRA. Accordingly, based 
our estimation results and the argument in Slemrod (1992, p. 45), it is argued here that TRA as 
specified above is the most useful form of this variable. 
Finally, there is the issue of the public’s job approval rating of the U.S. President per se 
(APPROV). It is argued here that the higher the public’s approval rating of the President’s job 
performance, the greater the degree to which there is satisfaction with the President’s actions and 
policies. The latter can be interpreted, at least to some degree, as implying less public resentment 
towards or greater approval of his various tax and/or spending policies. Indeed, Cebula (2007, p. 
314) has recently found that “…federal income-tax-related issues do strongly influence the public 
approval rating of the [U.S.] President”. Conversely, the lower the public’s approval rating of the 
President’s job performance, the greater the degree to which the public is likely to be dissatisfied 
with the President’s actions and policies. In turn, it can be reasonably argued that the latter can be 
interpreted, to at least some extent, as implying greater resentment of or less public support for his 
various tax and/or spending policies. Stated somewhat differently, the lower the level of APPROV, 
the greater the subjective benefits (“secondary gains”) from personal income tax evasion, whereas 
the higher the level of APPROV, the lower the subjective benefits (secondary gains) of personal 
income tax evasion. Based on this symmetrical argument, it is hypothesized that the greater the 
public’s approval rating of the President, the lower the eb, ceteris paribus, so that (4) becomes: 
 
(5) eb= k(AEPT, TF/TEN, TRA, APPROV), kAEPT > 0, kTF/TEN < 0,  kTRA < 0, kAPPROV < 0    
 
The data set used to measure the public’s job approval rating of the U.S. President involves 
responses to the following survey question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the U.S. 
President’s name] is handling his job as President?” Of course, one could argue that the public’s 
propensity to engage in income tax evasion might be related to its dissatisfaction with government 
in general and not to its job approval rating of the President per se and that the APPROV variable 
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merely reflects that more generalized dissatisfaction with government or government officials. In 
point of fact, evidence that this is not the case is provided below in two separate estimates, 
equations (14) and (14a).  
The expected gross costs of not reporting income to the IRS are hypothesized to be an 
increasing function of the expected risks/costs thereof (Pestieau, Possen, and Slutsky (1994); Erard 
and Feinstein (1994); Caballe and Panades (1997)). In this study, to the representative economic 
agent, the expected risks/costs from not reporting or from underreporting taxable income to the IRS 
are enhanced by an increase in AUDIT, the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns 
that is formally audited by IRS examiners/personnel, ceteris paribus. Indeed, the experience of an 
IRS tax audit could imply non-pecuniary ("psychic") costs as well as pecuniary costs (including 
outlays for legal or other representation, along with the value of one's own time) above and beyond 
any potential added taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS. In addition to AUDIT, it is 
hypothesized that the expected risks/costs of tax evasion also include the magnitude of the IRS 
imposed penalties (PENALTY) should one’s tax evasion activities be successfully detected by the 
IRS. To reflect this penalty, this study adopts the average interest rate charged by the IRS in each 
year on detected unreported income. Clearly, the greater the value of PENALTY, ceteris paribus, the 
greater the ec. Thus, we have:  
 
(6) ec = j(AUDIT, PENALTY), jAUDIT > 0, jPENALTY > 0         
 
Substituting from (5) and (6) into (1) yields:  
 
(7) pnr/(1-pnr) = b(AEPT, TF/TEN, TRA, APPROV, AUDIT, PENALTY), 
bAEPT >0, bTFTEN <0, bTRA <0, bAPPROV <0, bAUDIT < 0, bPENALTY <0    
  
Let AGI represent the actual total value of the aggregate federal adjusted gross income in 
the economy, i.e., AGI=UAGI+RAGI, where UAGI is the dollar size of the unreported aggregate 
federal adjusted gross income in the economy, and RAGI is the dollar size of the reported 
aggregate federal adjusted gross income in the economy. It reasonably follows overall that: 
 
(8) UAGI = (pnr)*AGI                    
and 
 
 (9) RAGI = (1-pnr)*AGI           
 
It then follows that: 
 
(10) UAGI/RAGI = (pnr)*AGI/(1-pnr)*AGI = (pnr)/(1-pnr)     
 
From (7) and (10), substitution for pnr/(1-pnr) in (1) yields: 
 
(11) UAGI/RAGI = b(AEPT, TF/TEN, TRA, APPROV, AUDIT, PENALTY), 
bAEPT >0, bTF/TEN <0, bTRA <0, bAPPROV <0, bAUDIT <0, bPENALTY <0    
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III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Based on the framework provided in (11) above, the following reduced-form equation is to 
be estimated: 
 
(12) (UAGI/RAGI)t = a0 + a1 AEPTt-1 + a2 (TF/TEN)t-1 + a3 TRAt + a4 APPROVt-1 + a5 AUDITt-1  
+ a6 PENALTYt-1 + u               
where:  
(UAGI/RAGI)t = the ratio of the aggregate unreported federal adjusted gross income in year t to 
the aggregate reported federal adjusted gross income in year t, expressed as a percent; 
a0 = constant term; 
AEPTt-1 = the average effective federal personal income tax rate in year t-1, expressed as a percent; 
(TF/TEN)t-1 = the ratio for year t-1 of the average annual tax-free interest rate yield on high grade 
municipal bonds to the average annual taxable interest rate yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury notes,  
expressed  as a percent; 
TRAt= a binary (dummy) variable for the years 1986 through 1988, when the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 was initially implemented and became fully effective:TRAt=1 for the years 1986, 1987, and 
1988, and TRAt =0 otherwise; 
APPROVt-1 = the public’s job approval rating of the President in year in year t-1: values for 
APPROVt-1 lie between 0 and 100;   
AUDITt-1 = the percentage of filed federal personal income tax returns in year t-1 that was subjected 
to a formal IRS audit involving IRS examiners; 
PENALTYt-1 = the average percentage interest rate used by the IRS in year t-1 to assess penalties on 
detected unreported income; and 
u = stochastic error term.  
The study period runs from 1960 through 2001, reflecting availability of the tax evasion 
data. The data are annual. The data for AEPT, AUDIT, and PENALTY were obtained from the IRS 
(1957-1997; 2003). The TRA variable is a dummy variable; the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was 
actually signed into law by President Reagan in October of 1986. The data for the variable TF/TEN 
were obtained from the Council of Economic Advisors (2008, Table B-73). The survey data for the 
variable APPROV were obtained from the University of California at Santa Barbara (2008) website 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/popularity.php?pres=&sort=time&direct=ASC&Submit=DIS
PLAY. The persons included in the survey were asked the question “Do you approve or disapprove 
of the way [the President’s name] is handling his job as U.S. President?” Observe the focus 
expressly on the assessment of the U.S. President’s job performance. 
 The first series adopted to measure income tax evasion, in this case represented by the 
variable UAGI/RAGI, were obtained from Feige (1989; 1994; 1996; 1997), extended back through 
1960. Based on the General Currency Ratio (GCR) model, Feige has estimated the ratio of 
aggregate unreported adjusted gross income to aggregate reported adjusted gross income, using an 
IRS estimate for this ratio as the baseline in his computations. The mean value for variable 
(UAGI/RAGI) for the study period was 20.28, with a standard deviation of 5.83.  
The P-P (Phillips-Perron) and ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) unit root tests indicate that 
the variables UAGI/RAGI, AEPT, and AUDIT are stationary only in first differences. On the other 
hand, the variables TF/TEN, APPROV, and PENALTY are stationary in levels. Accordingly, in the 
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estimations, the variables UAGI/RAGI, AEPT, and AUDIT are expressed in first differences form.   
The OLS estimation of equation (12), adopting the Newey-West heteroskedasticity 
correction, is given by: 
 
(13) z(UAGI/RAGI)t = +11.2 + 0.115 zAEPTt-1 – 6.92 (TF/TEN)t-1     – 2.231 TRAt 
                    (+2.19)        (-2.24)                        (-4.22) 
 
- 0.066 APPROVt-1 - 0.71 zAUDITt-1 – 0.21 PENALTYt-1 
(-2.45)         (-2.28)           (-2.58) 
 
R2 = 0.58, adjR2 = 0.53, F = 3.42, DW = 1.79, Rho = 0.09      
 
where terms in parentheses are t-values and z is the first-differences operator. In equation (13), the 
estimated coefficients on all six of the explanatory variables exhibit the hypothesized signs, with all 
six being statistically significant the five percent level or beyond. The coefficient of determination 
is 0.58, so that the model explains nearly three-fifths of the variation in the dependent variable. The 
F-statistic is significant at the one percent level. Finally, there should be no concern regarding 
autocorrelation. 
The estimated coefficient on the AEPT variable is positive and significant at the five percent 
level. Thus, the higher the average effective federal personal income tax rate, the greater the degree 
of federal income tax evasion by households, presumably because a higher income tax rate 
increases the incentive to evade taxes. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and 
with several previous empirical studies, e.g., Tanzi (1982), Clotfelder (1983), Feige (1994), and 
Cebula (1997). The estimated coefficient on the TF/TEN variable is negative and significant at the 
three percent level, affirming the hypothesis tested in Cebula (2004) that this form of legal tax 
avoidance does in fact act to reduce the degree of illegal tax evasion. The estimated coefficient on 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dummy variable is negative, as hypothesized (Musgrave, 1987), and 
statistically significant at the one percent level, providing evidence that taxpayers may have 
regarded the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as a genuine, honest effort to reform the inequities of and 
diminish the complexities (compliance costs) of the existing Internal Revenue Code. Alternatively, 
as implied by Slemrod (1992, p. 45), the observed drop in personal federal income tax evasion for 
this brief period may simply have reflected the time frame required by taxpayers to learn about and 
adjust to this allegedly “sweepingly reformed” (Musgrave, 1987) new version of the Internal 
Revenue Code.  Furthermore, as observed earlier, the coefficient on the TRA dummy loses its 
statistical significance once years beyond 1988 are included in its specification. This, TRA, as 
specified here, may be regarded as a “control variable.” The estimated coefficients on the variables 
AUDIT and PENALTY are both negative (as hypothesized) and statistically significant at the three 
and two percent levels, respectively. These two findings would suggest that taxpayers are 
discouraged from tax evasion behavior by increased prospects of detection (as represented by 
variable AUDIT) and by increased costs of tax evasion should such tax evasion behavior be 
detected (as reflected in the variable PENALTY). Finally, there is the central thesis of this study: 
“Does a lower (higher) job approval rating of the President by the U.S. public act to increase 
(decrease) the degree of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion?” As shown in equation 
(13), the estimated coefficient on variable APPROV is negative (as hypothesized) and statistically 
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significant at the 2.5 percent level. Thus, the findings shown in equation (13) appear to provide 
strong empirical support for the central hypothesis of this study, namely that the higher (lower) the 
public’s job approval rating of the U.S. President, the lower (higher) the aggregate degree of federal 
personal income tax evasion (in the U.S.). 
One reasonable way to test the robustness of these results and in particular the finding for 
the variable APPROV is to integrate into the system a separate and different measure of the public’s 
dissatisfaction/satisfaction with government, one that (at least in theory) reflects different 
sentiments from those impounded in the APPROV variable. This suggestion was first made by 
Feige (1994), who hypothesized that the greater the public’s dissatisfaction with government 
officials per se (as opposed to the U.S. President per se), the greater might be the subjective 
benefits of personal federal income taxation. To test this hypothesis, Feige (1994) adopts the 
variable DIS, which represents the “dissatisfaction index.” This index is constructed as an equally 
weighted average of three normalized indices reflecting answers to the University of Michigan’s 
Institute for Social Research annual surveys concerning (i) whether government officials (exclusive 
of the U.S. President) can be trusted (to honor obligations to the public), (ii) whether said 
government officials (exclusive of the President) are dishonest, and (iii) whether said government 
officials (exclusive of the President) waste tax dollars. Values for this index of dissatisfaction lie 
within a range of (-1.5), which corresponds to least dissatisfied, to (+1.5), which corresponds to 
most dissatisfied. Thus, the algebraic value of DIS is higher as the public becomes more dissatisfied 
with government officials. As in Feige (1994), it is hypothesized here that the higher the value of 
DIS, the more benefit (utility) people derive from avoiding taxes through the underreporting of 
income to the IRS, i.e., the greater the subjective benefits of income tax evasion, ceteris paribus. 
Data were obtained from the University of Michigan (1960-1997) and Cebula, Koch, and Paul 
(2003). Over the study period, the P-P and ADF unit root tests reveal that DIS is stationary in first 
differences. Therefore, it is expressed in first differences form in the estimate. Introduction of this 
de facto control variable should enable us to determine whether or not the Presidential approval 
rating variable (APPROV) merely is capturing the broader dissatisfaction (or satisfaction) that the 
public feels towards to government officials in general as opposed to the U.S President.  
Integrating this additional variable into equation (12) and estimating by OLS using the 
Newey-West heteroskedasticity correction yields: 
 
(14) z(UAGI/RAGI)t = 10.12 + 0.131 zAEPTt-1 – 6.4 (TF/TEN)t-1 – 2.01 TRAt 
                 (+2.17)       (-2.21)    (-3.82) 
 
- 0.065 APPROVt-1 – 0.71 zAUDITt-1 – 0.23 PENALTYt-1 + 0.99 zDISt-1 
(-2.39)        (-2.26)                    (-2.74)         (+1.04) 
 
R2 = 0.59, adj R2 = 0.53, F = 3.22, DW= 1.80, Rho = 0.09 
      
 As shown in estimate (14), the estimated coefficient on the DIS variable, although positive, 
is not statistically significant. This finding of an inability to reject H0 with respect to the DIS 
variable is entirely consistent with the empirical finding in Feige (1994). As for the remaining 
results in estimate (14), they are entirely consistent with those in estimate (13) above. Especially 
noteworthy is the fact that the coefficient on the variable APPROV, despite the presence of the DIS 
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variable, remains negative (as hypothesized) and is statistically significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
Thus, the evidence points again to a conclusion that the greater (lesser) the public’s job approval 
rating of the U.S. President per se, the lower (higher) the degree of aggregate federal personal 
income tax evasion.  
 Interestingly, substitution of the dissatisfaction variable for the Presidential Approval 
variable (APPROV) yields the following results: 
 
(14a) z(UAGI/RAGI)t = 7.2 + 0.15 zAEPTt-1 – 7.1 (TF/TEN)t-1 - 2.55 TRAt 
       (+2.65)              (-2.33)    (-4.12) 
 
- 0.52 zAUDITt-1 – 0.13 PENALTYt-1 + 1.02 zDISt-1 
(-0.99)      (-1.62)  (+0.99) 
 
R2 = 0.46, adjR2 = 0.41, F = 1.76, DW = 1.73, Rho = 0.13  
     
In this case, substitution of the dissatisfaction index for the Presidential job approval rating 
generates some very different conclusions. Although the AEPT, TF/TEN, and TRA variables retain 
their statistical significance, the AUDIT and PENALTY variables lose theirs. The R2 and adjusted R2 
values are noticeably lower, and the F-statistic is not statistically significant at even the ten percent 
level.  Perhaps even more relevant is the finding that the DIS variable is not statistically significant 
at even the ten percent level. The latter result, which, as already observed, is consistent with the 
empirical finding in Feige (1994), demonstrates that the DIS variable and APPROV variable appear 
to exercise very different impacts on income tax evasion behavior. Indeed, the APPROV variable 
exercises a negative and statistically significant influence over the degree of federal personal 
income tax evasion, whereas the dissatisfaction index, which does not involve the public’s approval 
rating of the U.S. President per se, exercises no statistically significant impact on that tax evasion.   
To further test the robustness of the results shown in equation (13), consider Table 1, where 
three alternative versions of the basic model are provided. In column (a), the binary variable 
adopted to reflect the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was dropped from equation (12) in the event that the 
results might be sensitive to this dummy variable as specified. As shown, the non-TRA results in 
column (a) of the Table are entirely compatible with those in equation (13), so that the basic results 
do not appear sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the TRA dummy. According to column (a) of 
Table 1, the relative degree of federal personal income tax evasion (as measured) is an increasing 
function of the average tax rate while being a decreasing function of the ratio of the interest rate 
yield on high grade tax free municipals to the taxable interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes, 
the IRS audit rate, and the penalty interest rate adopted by the IRS to be assessed on detected 
unreported income. In addition, the estimated coefficient on the APPROV variable is negative and 
statistically significant at the one percent level, providing further support for the hypothesis that the 
lower (higher) the public’s job approval rating of the President, the greater (lower) the degree of 
federal personal income tax evasion. 
Next, consider column (b) of Table 1. In this column, the model in equation (12) is 
estimated using a different data set for the tax evasion variable. Namely, in this estimate, we adopt 
the Tanzi (1982; 1983) estimate of aggregate federal personal income tax evasion extended through 
2001. In this case, the tax evasion variable, which was also derived using a GCR model, is 
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represented by the aggregate level of federal personal income tax evasion expressed as a percent of 
the GDP. Over the 1960-2001 study period, the mean of this measure of aggregate federal personal 
income tax evasion was 4.9, and the standard deviation was 0.58. Like the Feige measure of income 
tax evasion, for the study period, the Tanzi measure is also stationary only in first differences form 
(according to the P-P and ADF tests).  As shown in Table 1, the results in column (b) are 
effectively consistent with those in equation (13).  In particular, all six of the estimated coefficients 
exhibit the expected signs and are statistically significant at the five percent level or beyond. Of 
greatest interest here is the coefficient on the APPROV variable, which is negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. Thus, the evidence once again reveals that federal personal 
income tax evasion in the U.S. varies inversely with the public’s job rating of the U.S. President: 
the lower (higher) the President’s approval rating, the greater (lower) the aggregate degree of 
federal personal income tax evasion.   
Finally, consider column (c) of Table 1. In this case, the measure of tax evasion is based on 
the AGI-Gap Approach, as estimated by Ledbetter (2004, Table 5). The approach in Ledbetter 
(2004) is one that computes the discrepancy between the AGI reported to the IRS and an 
independent estimate of the aggregate AGI derived from the National Income and Product Accounts 
of aggregate personal income. In particular, “…the relative AGI gap is the AGI gap as a percentage 
of the BEA [Bureau of Economic Analysis]-derived AGI” (Ledbetter, 2004, p. 14). This series is 
not sensitive to the restrictive kinds of assumptions found in currency ratio models. In any event, 
for the 1960-2001 study period, the average ratio of tax evasion as a percent is 10.98, with a 
standard deviation of 1.32. Based upon the P-P and ADF tests, this measure of the tax evasion 
variable is stationary only in first differences. Experimentation revealed that this series was quite 
sensitive to the presence of the TRA dummy; consequently, the model estimated in column (a) of 
Table 1 was adopted in this case for estimation and reporting purposes. As shown in column (c), the 
coefficient on the Presidential approval variable is significant at the 2.5 percent level, lending yet 
further support for the central hypothesis being investigated in this study.    
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates the hypothesis that the lower (higher) the public’s job approval 
rating of the U.S. President, the higher (lower) the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax 
evasion in the U.S. The study period runs from 1960 through 2001.  On the one hand, the 
hypothesis implies that there is a greater “secondary gain” to federal personal income tax evasion 
when the public is giving a lower approval rating to the U.S. President’s job performance; this 
secondary gain increases the motivation for households to evade federal personal income tax 
liabilities. On the other hand, this secondary gain from income tax evasion diminishes when the 
public gives the President a higher job approval rating; the latter then diminishes the motivation to 
actually evade federal personal income taxes. This study finds consistent empirical support for this 
hypothesis, namely, that in the U.S. the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax evasion is a 
decreasing function of the public’s job approval rating of the U.S. President. In closing, it is 
arguably possible to some degree to interpret the aggregate degree of federal personal income tax 
evasion in the U.S. as a form of implicit “within-term” voting, i.e., voting by (non) taxing behavior 
may be occurring. Naturally, formal investigation of such an interpretation would require the 
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development and testing of an appropriately specified model of voting behavior, one which would 
expand the interpretation of the “rational voter model.” 
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Table 1. Three Alternative Estimates* 
Variable\Estimation   (a)  (b)  (c)   
a0     +12.2  +1.5  +1.6 
 
zAEPTt-1    +0.12  +0.11  +0.09 
     (+2.18) (+2.04) (+2.56) 
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(TF/TEN)t-1    -7.25   -2.08  -2.13 
     (-2.48)  (-2.79)  (-0.69) 
 
TRAt     -------  -0.181  ------- 
       (-3.05)   
 
APPROVt-1    -0.077  -0.052  -0.044 
     (-2.68)  (-2.54)  (-2.35) 
 
zAUDITt-1    -0.803  -0.697  -0.641 
     (-2.70)  (-3.95)  (-2.98) 
 
PENALTYt-1    -0.27  -0.23  -0.11 
     (-3.15)  (-2.20)  (-1.99) 
 
 
R2     0.54  0.53  0.55 
AdjR2     0.46  0.47  0.45 
F     3.40  2.93  4.89 
DW     1.80  2.16  1.80 
Rho     0.09  -0.08  0.09 
*In all estimates, the Newey-West heteroskedasticity correction was adopted. Terms in parentheses 
are t-values.  
